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I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s complicated world, the distinction between international
and domestic issues can be a fine line, and one that States are still in
the process of settling.1 This is especially true for embassies and
diplomatic missions, which, among their various duties, must assist
with the processing and transportation of refugees.2 Furthermore,
consuls have in the past provided protection to foreign nationals
when such persons have previously been persecuted by their home
State.3 But may a State’s embassy provide protection to a national of
the host State without violating international law?
This question arose in late April of 2012, when Chen Guangcheng
escaped from unofficial house arrest in Shandong Province,
ultimately seeking protection from American diplomats in Beijing.4
The U.S. Embassy sheltered Chen, and the Chinese government
condemned the undertaking as violating international law.5 However,
1. See EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 461 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining how
States direct multiple agencies within foreign States to aid in investment and
immigration control in addition to the conveyance of their culture).
2. See generally LUKE T. LEE & JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND
PRACTICE 107–15 (3d ed. 2008) (presenting an in-depth discussion of consular
functions ranging from the protection of nationals to the processing of refugees).
3. See, e.g., Corey Flintoff, The Current U.S.-China Standoff Has a
Precedent, NPR (Apr. 30, 2012), www.npr.org/2012/04/30/151706572/thecurrent-u-s-china-standoff-has-a-precedent (referring to Fang Lizhi, who sought
protection from the American Embassy in Beijing for over one year after his
involvement with the Tiananmen Square protests).
4. Id.
5. See Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Remarks on Chen
Guangcheng’s Entering the U.S. Embassy in China, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF CHINA (May 2, 2012), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/
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China also potentially violated international law by subjecting Chen
and his family to torture during his house arrest.6
This comment will first discuss the relevant international law
applicable in this case, including the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, the Convention Against Torture, and jus
cogens norms.7 It will then discuss whether China’s treatment of
Chen constituted a violation of international human rights laws,
justifying encroachment into China’s internal affairs by the United
States.8 The comment will conclude that protecting victims of human
rights abuses does not amount to interference with the internal affairs
of the host state.9 Finally, the comment will recommend that the
United States clarify its policy regarding Article 41 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Rights and that the Convention Against
Torture should include a provision that Article 3 of the Convention
applies without geographic limitations.10

II. BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Chen, blind since childhood, is a self-taught lawyer from China’s
rural Shandong province.11 In 2005, Chen filed a class-action lawsuit
against officials in his province, accusing them of forcing women to
undergo late-term abortions and sterilization under China’s one-child

t928382.htm [hereinafter Remarks on Entering Embassy] (“The US Embassy in
China has the obligation to abide by relevant international laws and Chinese laws,
and should not engage in activities irrelevant to its duties.”).
6. See Jane Perlez & Andrew Jacobs, A Car Chase, Secret Talks and Second
Thoughts, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/world/asia/
a-car-chase-secret-talks-and-second-thoughts.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&ref=
global=home (averring that the Chens were severely beaten when they tried to
communicate with the outside world).
7. See discussion infra Part II(B)–(D).
8. See discussion infra Part III(B) (establishing that officials in China posed a
serious threat to Chen’s safety that created an obligation for the United States not
to return Chen to China).
9. See discussion infra Part III(C).
10. See discussion infra Part IV (recommending these improvements to prevent
comparable occurrences in the future).
11. Sui-Lee Wee, Blind Chinese Activist’s Brother Says Officials Destroyed
Abuse Evidence, REUTERS (June 8, 2012 7:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/06/08/us-china-dissident-village-idUSBRE8570FP20120608.
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policy.12 Chen was placed under house arrest beginning in August
2005 and was formally arrested in June 2006 for allegedly disrupting
traffic and damaging property.13 After serving his four-year sentence,
Chen was released from prison in September 2010.14 Following his
release, Chen and his family were placed under house arrest and
isolated from the outside world,15 even though no additional charges
were brought against Chen.16
While under house arrest, Chen and his family were prevented by
the local government from communicating with the outside world.17
Any attempt by Chen or his wife to leave or contact the outside
world resulted in beatings from guards hired by local government
officials.18 Moreover, anyone attempting to visit Chen was accosted,
beaten, and turned away by the guards.
Chen escaped from house arrest in late April 2012 and sought
protection at the American Embassy in Beijing.19 Once Chen was
inside the embassy, American officials negotiated with Chinese
Foreign Ministry officials to guarantee his protection should he leave
the embassy.20 Since Chen left Shandong province, his remaining
12. China’s Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2012),
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17866176.
13. Id.
14. Elizabeth M. Lynch, Slow Killing in Rural China, CHINA LAW & POLICY
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://chinalawandpolicy.com/2012/02/29/slow-killing-in-ruralchina.
15. See id. (describing Chen as “currently under unlawful house arrest with his
wife and two small children, guarded 24 hours a day by local thugs, denied access
to medical care as well as to all visitors and at times subject to physical abuse”).
16. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (explaining that no charges were pending
when the decision was made to turn Chen’s home into a “makeshift prison”); Chen
Guangcheng, Op-Ed., How China Flouts Its Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012,
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/opinion/how-china-flouts-its-laws.html (suggesting
that Chen was subjected to house arrest without any valid legal basis for the
detention).
17. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (“When the Chens broke the rules – by
trying to sneak out messages or secretly detailing their mistreatment in a
homemade video – they were viciously beaten.”).
18. See Erik Eckholm, Even in New York, China Casts a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/asia/chen-guancheng-is-safein-new-york-but-thinks-of-china.html?_r=2&hp (describing beatings Chen and his
family received from local police).
19. Keith B. Richburg & Steven Mufson, Chen Guangcheng, Blind Chinese
Lawyer-Activist, Escapes House Arrest, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2012, at A8.
20. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (mentioning that Chen chose not to

2013]

GIMME SHELTER

909

family members have suffered at the hands of local officials.21 Local
police beat Chen’s brother as well as his brother’s family late one
night, and Chen’s nephew was arrested when he attempted to fight
off the intruders.22
Eventually Chinese and American officials reached an agreement
whereby Chen, along with his family, would be allowed to travel to
New York City, where he could study law at New York University.23
Chen and his family left China on May 19, 2012.24 However, the
agreement did not stop Chinese officials from condemning the
United States’ actions, declaring that the United States had violated
international law by protecting Chen during his time at the American
Embassy.25
After news broke that Chen had escaped house arrest and had
sought shelter from the American Embassy in Beijing, the Chinese
government wasted little time before publicly protesting. The
Chinese spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Liu
Weimen, released several statements in early May accusing the
United States of violating international law by meddling in China’s
internal affairs.26 Although Liu did not explicitly say which
assert an asylum claim in the United States and therefore American officials at first
attempted to broker a deal for protection in China).
21. See Eckholm, supra note 18 (describing how police “rampaged” through
Chen’s home, beating those they found there).
22. See id. (expounding that his brother’s wife now has limited mobility of her
right arm due to the beatings); Wee, supra note 11 (noting that Chen’s nephew
now faces homicide charges for resisting officials).
23. Eckholm, supra note 18 (noting that Chen’s status as a visiting scholar is
for an indefinite period of time).
24. China’s Blind Activist, supra note 12.
25. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5 (asserting that the United
States violated international law by interfering with China’s internal affairs); see
also Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Remarks on US Secretary of
State Clinton’s Public Statement on Chen Guangcheng, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF CHINA (May 3, 2012), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/
s2510/t928383.htm (reiterating China’s disapproval of the United States’ actions)
[hereinafter Remarks on US Secretary of State Clinton’s Public Statement]; Mo
Nong, US Violates International Law, CHINA DAILY (May 7, 2012),
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-05/07/content_15221189.htm (“If the US
government follows international laws and the basic norms of relations among
nations, it does not have the right to make any demands on the Chinese
government. . . . It has broken international laws and Chinese laws and interfered
in China’s internal affairs.”).
26. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5; Remarks on US Secretary
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international law the United States had violated, the fact that the
statement refers to interference in internal affairs suggests Liu was
referencing Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.27 Because Chen is a Chinese citizen, the Chinese
government asserts that the American Embassy has no interest in
protecting him and has instead engaged “in activities irrelevant to its
duties.”28 The Chinese government believes that, as Chen was being
handled by local Chinese officials, the situation was outside any of
the United States’ diplomatic duties and constituted an interference
that was motivated by non-diplomatic reasons.29
In China it is common for the government to physically abuse and
torture political and legal activists.30 Additionally, political dissidents
receive exceptionally savage mistreatment compared with the
average prisoner.31 Those who speak out against China’s one-child
policy are often granted asylum in the United States because the risk
of torture is so severe.32 The United States has even protected
of State Clinton’s Public Statement, supra note 25.
27. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 41(1), Apr. 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“Without
prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying
such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving
State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.”);
see also Julian Ku, Who Violated International Law in the Chen Case: The U.S. or
China?, OPINIO JURIS (May 3, 2012 3:24 AM), opiniojuris.org/2015/05/03/whoviolated-international-law-in-the-chen-case-the-u-s-or-china/ (stating that China
probably considered the United States’ actions to violate Article 41 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
28. Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5.
29. See, e.g., Nong, supra note 25 (alleging that, from a Chinese perspective,
the United States’ aid to Chen and interference with China’s internal affairs
hinders China’s development).
30. See XIAOBING LI, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CHINA 120–21 (2010) (asserting that
in 2006 “at least 930 cases of police torture took place”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2011: CHINA 3 (2011) [hereinafter STATE
DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/186478.pdf (affirming that activists continue to suffer official
harassment).
31. STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT, supra note 30, at 4 (reporting that
political and religious prisoners were subject to tortuous treatment that was
particularly harsh compared to that of ordinary prisoners).
32. See, e.g., Cao v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 407 F.3d 146, 150, 161
(3d Cir. 2005) (granting review of the denial of asylum to protect the applicant
from repercussions for exposing abhorrent abortion and infanticide practices in
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political activists inside the American Embassy before, just as it did
for Chen.33

B. VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The purpose of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is
to create a set of rules to govern the interaction between diplomatic
missions and sovereign States.34 Most States, including both the
United States and China, have ratified this treaty.35 Article 41(1)
requires States to both respect the laws of the host State and not
interfere with the host State’s internal affairs.36
Although few cases have interpreted this particular section, the
International Court of Justice has stated that the purpose of this
article was to prevent embassy staff from engaging in actions that
were an abuse of an embassy’s functions, such as espionage.37
Article 41(1) places the obligation of non-interference in internal
affairs closely to the obligation to respect the receiving State’s laws,
making the article difficult to interpret and leading to multiple
disagreements over whether conduct constituted interference in
internal affairs.38
However, commentary on Article 41 suggests that the rule was
formulated to restrict a diplomat’s personal comments and activities,
executed on his or her own without direction from the embassy.39
Chinese hospitals to a Hong Kong reporter).
33. See Flintoff, supra note 3 (referring to the case of Fang Lizhi, an
astrophysicist whose writings prompted the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989).
34. See Vienna Convention, supra note 27, pmbl.
35. See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 345
(2009–2010 ed. 2009) (listing the multitude of States that have signed the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, including the United States and China).
36. Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 41(1).
37. See U.S. Diplomatic Relations and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 84 (May 24) (revealing that Article 41 was included to
ensure that diplomatic missions are not used in ways that are contradictory to
diplomatic purposes).
38. See, e.g., DENZA, supra note 1, at 466 (recounting a disagreement between
the United Kingdom and Burma in which the Burmese government accused the
British of meddling in internal affairs because the British Ambassador attempted to
visit opposition leader Aung Suu Kyi).
39. Id. at 464. But see Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Scope of Consular Immunity
Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Towards a Principled
Interpretation, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 847 (1998) (disputing such an
interpretation and noting that some approach Article 41 as applicable to any
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Conflicts have often arisen between a host State’s desire to be free
from interference in its internal affairs and another State’s desire to
promote human rights.40

C. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND NONREFOULEMENT
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention
Against Torture in 1984, and the Convention went into effect in
1987.41 The first article in the Convention Against Torture 42 states
that torture may be committed by inflicting pain on a person, or a
third person, with the purpose of obtaining information from,
punishing, or intimidating the person.43 Arbitrary detention can be
considered a form of torture.44
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
definition of torture in Bromfield v. Mukasey,45 a case involving a
Jamaican national plaintiff who claimed he could not be returned to
Jamaica because of the violence against homosexuals that he would
be subject to there.46 The Ninth Circuit held that beatings and killings
activity that “adversely affects the interests of the receiving State or its nationals”).
40. DENZA, supra note 1, at 465–66; see also LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 2, at
77 (“Diplomats and consuls have on occasion assisted receiving State nationals
whose human rights may have been violated by the receiving State. Receiving
States have at times objected to such activity as interference in their internal
affairs.”).
41. HANS DANELIUS, CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (2008), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp_e.pdf.
42. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture] (“[A]ny act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person action in an official capacity.”).
43. Id.; accord 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18 (2012) (codifying obligations under the
Convention Against Torture in U.S. domestic law).
44. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184–85 (D. Mass. 1995)
(recognizing that arbitrary detention is a violation of international law equal to
torture, summary executions, and disappearance).
45. 543 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).
46. Id. at 1073.
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constitute acts of torture.47 Additionally, it is not necessary to
demonstrate that the government will torture the individual, but
merely that the government acquiesced or was willfully blind to the
performance of torture.48 In Bromfield, the court found that sufficient
evidence existed to demonstrate that the Jamaican government
acquiesced to the torture of homosexuals, and remanded the case to
determine if the plaintiff would more likely than not be tortured on
his return.49
The fact that an individual may be unable to assert an asylum
claim under United States law does not necessarily bar that
individual from relief under the Convention Against Torture.50 In
addition to preventing torture, the Convention Against Torture also
forbids a State from expelling, returning, or extraditing a person to
another state if there is a substantial danger that the person would
be tortured on his return.51 This is otherwise known as
nonrefoulement, a principle also established in the Refugee
Convention.52 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits
member States from expelling or returning a refugee to a place
where his or her freedom or life is threatened due to race, religion,

47. Id. at 1079 (citing Comollari v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir.
2004)); accord Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that Al-Saher was entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture because
the sustained and severe beatings he suffered constituted torture).
48. Bromfield, 543 F.3d at 1079; accord Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d
1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is enough that public officials could have inferred
torture was taking place, remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by because
of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it.”).
49. Bromfield, 543 F.3d at 1079 (referencing the criminalization of homosexual
conduct, the lack of investigation by police into abuse of gay men, and the Country
Report showing that gay men are often beaten and killed as the evidence relied on
by the court).
50. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that
“claims for relief under the Convention are analytically separate for claims of
asylum”); see also Richard P. Shafer, Construction and Application of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, or Punishment, 184 A.L.R. FED. 385, § 2 (2003) (detailing authority
which holds that the inability to state an asylum claim does not necessarily
preclude relief).
51. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 3(1).
52. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 4 (2008), available
at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/prsr/prsr_e.pdf.
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nationality, or membership in a political or social group.53
An important factor to be considered when determining whether
there is a risk of torture upon return includes the occurrence of
torture in the recent past.54 A pattern of mass human rights violations
will be considered but that alone is not enough to prove a risk of
torture, although the Committee will look at all relevant
considerations.55 There must be additional grounds to show that the
specific individual was at risk for torture on his or her return other
than only a pattern of mass violations.56
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights addressed the
principle of nonrefoulement in Haitian Interdiction v. United
States.57 In this case, the petitioners claimed that the United States
had been intercepting Haitian refugees (“boat people”) and returning
them to Haiti where they regularly faced a severe threat of abuse
from the Haitian military.58 The petitioners demonstrated that
military authorities burned down hundreds of houses belonging to
activists and supporters of opposing factions.59 Once the United
States Coast Guard seized the refugees, they were handed over to
Haitian immigration authorities where the Haitian military
53. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (“No Contracting State shall
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”).
54. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, A.R. v. Neth., Communication No.
203/2002, U.N. Doc. A/59/44, at 252 (Nov. 14, 2003) (holding that the
complainant, who was previously tortured twenty years beforehand, did not show a
violation of the Convention when the time lapse increased the probability that
conditions in the receiving State had drastically changed).
55. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Bachan Singh Sogi v. Can.,
Communication No. 297/2006, U.N. Doc. A/63/44, at 234 (Nov. 16, 2007)
(explaining that when evaluating the risk of torture, “the Committee must take
account of all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights”).
56. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil
Agiza v. Swed., Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 227 (May
20, 2005) (“[A]dditional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned
was personally at risk.”).
57. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 51/96,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997).
58. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
59. Id. ¶¶ 25, 39–41.

2013]

GIMME SHELTER

915

interrogated and threatened them.60
The petitioners in Haitian Interdiction argued that the United
States violated customary international law, which prohibits the
return of refugees to their home country when they would face
persecution or a threat against their life if returned.61 The United
States responded by arguing that Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention was a narrow duty that only applied to refugees who had
already reached the territory of the contracting State.62 The
Commission did not agree with the United States, instead holding
that “Article 33 ha[s] no geographical limitations.”63

D. JUS COGENS NORMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Jus cogens norms are principles of international law that are
acknowledged by the international community to be of such vital
importance that no derogation will be tolerated.64 Jus cogens norms
are at the top of a normative hierarchy, meaning that these norms
override treaties, persistent objections, or claims of extenuating
circumstances.65 States have an interest in human rights violations
regardless of where the offense occurs because the obligation to
prevent human rights abuses runs to all States.66 Diplomatic missions
60. See id. ¶¶ 26–27 (submitting evidence that the returnees “were asked why
they left Haiti, and were verbally abused by the police,” who periodically
“threatened to imprison and kill them”).
61. Id. ¶ 3.
62. Id. ¶ 71. Contra Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23,
1969, 25 I.L.M. 543, 115 U.N.T.S. 331 (proclaiming that a State cannot engage in
behavior that undermines the purpose of a treaty).
63. Haitian Interdiction, Case 10.675 ¶¶ 157, 171 (stating that the United
State’s “act of interdicting Haitians on the high seas, placing them in vessels under
their jurisdiction, returning them to Haiti, and leaving them exposed to acts of
brutality by the Haitian military and its supporters constitutes a breach of the right
to security of the Haitian refugees”).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmt. k (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW]; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595,
765 (July 11) (Kreca, J., dissenting) (affirming that a State may intercede when a
human rights violation occurs even if the violation does not concern a national of
the State).
65. BRAD R. ROTH, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT:
PREMISES OF A PLURALIST INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 264 (2011).
66. See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, § 703
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are increasingly concerned with working to preserve human rights
for non-nationals.67
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held
in Domingues v. United States that an American State’s law that
subjects juveniles to the death penalty does not supersede human
rights treaties preventing such punishment.68 Domingues, the
petitioner, was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death in
Nevada.69 Domingues was only sixteen years old when he committed
the crimes.70 Domingues claimed the United States violated a jus
cogens norm forbidding juvenile offenders from being executed,
breaching Article 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man.71 To prove a jus cogens norm existed, Dominquez
relied on various treaties and conventions that forbid the execution of
criminal offenders under eighteen years of age.72
cmt. a (“Unless the human rights agreement provides or clearly implies otherwise,
the ordinary remedies are available to any state party against a state party violating
the agreement, even if the violation did not affect nationals of the claimant state
party or any other particular interest of that state.”); see also ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 394–95 (2d ed. 2005) (suggesting that human rights
violations create community obligations, meaning that any action to correct human
rights abuses is exercised on behalf of the entire international community).
67. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 2, at 208–09 (“These principles would
seem to cover the right of a sending State, through its diplomatic and consular
personnel, to take a variety of measures in regard to the rights of persons
regardless of nationality, over and against an objection by the receiving State that
the action is an unlawful interference in its internal affairs”).
68. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 62/02, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, ¶ 85 (2002).
69. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
70. Id. ¶ 2.
71. Id. ¶ 3 (claiming that the United States violated the treaty by failing to
prevent the State of Nevada from executing juveniles); see also American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. 1, Res. XXX, Final Act of the
Ninth International Conference of American States (Pan American Union),
Bogota, Colombia, Mar. 30–May 2, 1948, at 38; reprinted in Handbook of
Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 Doc. 21 Rev. 6, at
5 (1979) (“Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his
person.”).
72. Domingues, Case 12.285, ¶ 19 (citing, inter alia, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child art. 37(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
(preventing execution of those under 18; ratified by 189 of the 191 countries in the
United Nations) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
6(5), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (forbidding
minors from being executed; ratified by the United States in 1992).
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The Commission found that ratification of treaties since 1987
showed sufficient widespread agreement to constitute a norm
disallowing the execution of persons under the age of eighteen.73 In
conclusion, the Commission stated that the United States “acted
contrary to international norms of jus cogens . . . by sentencing
Michael Domingues to the death penalty for crimes that he
committed when he was 16 years of age.”74 Although the United
States argued that they were not bound by the norm because of the
United States’ persistent objections,75 the Commission rejected this
argument, holding that a jus cogens norm “cannot be validly
derogated from, whether by treaty or by objection of a State,
persistent or otherwise.”76
When a State violates its human rights obligations, any other State
may pursue remedies against the violator.77 The International Court
of Justice has held that States are bound by customary international
law not to torture.78 For example, the Court ruled that Uganda’s
torture of civilians in the Congo, among other atrocities, violated
international law.79 Torture and prolonged arbitrary detention
constitute human rights violations that are prohibited by jus cogens
norms.80
73. Domingues, Case 12.285, ¶ 68 (mentioning the acceptance by nearly all
States of treaties prohibiting execution of juveniles).
74. Id. ¶ 112.
75. See id. ¶ 101 (“[T]he United States contends that it has consistently
asserted its right to execute juvenile offenders, by making reservations to treaties,
filing briefs before national and international tribunals, and making public
statements . . . .”).
76. Id. ¶ 85.
77. RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, § 703(2),
cmt. b (stating that these obligations apply even if the victims are not nationals of
the enforcing State and do not affect the enforcing State’s interests).
78. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 80 (Dec. 19) (holding that obligations under
international humanitarian law and human rights law not to torture “are binding on
the Parties as customary international law”).
79. Id. at 77 (concluding that UPDF troops committed “torture and other forms
of inhumane treatment of the civilian population . . . and did not take measures to
ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the occupied
territories”).
80. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming
that beatings and killings constitute torture); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that torture and arbitrary detention “constitute
fully recognizable violations of international law”); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,
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III. ANALYSIS
A. CHINA IS GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BECAUSE ITS
TREATMENT OF CHEN AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVISTS
CONSTITUTES TORTURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Chinese officials’ treatment of Chen81 satisfies the plain
meaning of torture under Article 1 of the Convention Against
Torture.82 To be considered torture, the pain or suffering experienced
must be severe and intentionally inflicted.83 Finally, the physical pain
inflicted cannot be torture without an accompanying motivation or
acquiescence of the government or a public official.84
China’s treatment of Chen meets the element of pain and
suffering. In Chen’s case, he was kept under house arrest even
though there were no charges against him at that time,85 which is a
form of mental suffering because he was not allowed to go about his
daily life.86 In addition, Chen and his wife were physically beaten
when they attempted to leave or contact the outside world during
their detention.87 Visitors to Chen’s home were often turned away
and harassed in an attempt to intimidate Chen and further increase
his isolation and mental anguish.88 Furthermore, Chinese officials
retaliated against Chen after his escape by both assaulting his

34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 11, 275 (2002) (asserting that “the prohibition against torture
has achieved the status of a preemptory norm in international law”).
81. See discussion supra Part II(A) (discussing the Chinese government’s
behavior toward Chen).
82. See DANELIUS, supra note 41, at 141 (explaining that the definition of
torture as set out in the Convention Against Torture is more “elaborate” and
“complex” than previous definitions); see also STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA
REPORT, supra note 30, at 2–8 (reporting on the regular torture and detention of
individuals to prevent the expression of opposing viewpoints).
83. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1(1); see also discussion
supra Part II(C) (delineating the requirements for an act to constitute torture).
84. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1(1).
85. Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (recounting that Chen had been held captive
in his home since his release from jail in September 2010).
86. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184–85 (D. Mass. 1995)
(recognizing that arbitrary detention is a violation of international law equal to
torture, summary executions, and disappearance).
87. Id.; Chen, supra note 16.
88. See Lynch, supra note 14 (reporting that 100 guards and 2 cellphone
jammers were employed to keep Chen isolated from the world).

2013]

GIMME SHELTER

919

brother’s family and attacking his brother’s home.89
Not only did China inflict pain and suffering on Chen, but the
level at which they did so is sufficiently severe to constitute torture.90
The local Chinese officials intentionally inflicted this pain and
suffering on Chen by beating him and his family in an attempt to
control Chen’s behavior and to persecute him for his activism.91 The
pain is factually severe because the security officers also inflicted
brutal attacks on Chen’s visitors and family in addition to confining
his family.92
Chen’s abuse satisfies one essential element of torture; therefore,
the analysis may proceed to address the element of coercion.93 Under
the Convention Against Torture, to be considered torture,
government action must be undertaken in an effort to intimidate or
coerce the victim.94 In this case, China’s motivations were to
pressure Chen to discontinue his efforts at political and legal
activism.95 In 2005, Chen filed a class-action lawsuit against Chinese
officials for imposing the one-child population law through forced,
late-term abortions and sterilization.96 Chen’s defiant actions angered
89. Chen, supra note 16.
90. Cf. Cao v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 407 F.3d 146, 150, 154 (3d Cir.
2005) (determining that in the plaintiff’s case, beatings administered by public
security officers and other prisoners during an interrogation amounted to torture).
91. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2008)
(differentiating between random violence and persecution because of a person’s
protected status).
92. Cf. Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil
Agiza v. Swed., Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 198, ¶ 2.4
(May 20, 2005) (detailing how the petitioner’s “wife contended that, if returned
she would be detained for many years as the complainant’s wife” which was taken
into consideration when determining their status under the principle of
nonrefoulement).
93. See CAROL BOHMER & AMY SHUMAN, REJECTING REFUGEES: POLITICAL
ASYLUM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 205 (2008) (“In fact the U.S. law, which
expressively makes objection to coercive population control a basis for asylum
(like the one-child policy in China), counts this as persecution based on political
opinion.”).
94. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1(1); see also OmelasChavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
motivation requirement of torture may also be satisfied by willful blindness).
95. See LI, supra note 30, at 44–45 (affirming that Chinese authorities harass
and torture political and legal activists to restrict their expression on divergent
opinions).
96. Richburg & Mufson, supra note 19.
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the Chinese government.97 Since Chen filed suit, Chinese officials
have persecuted and imprisoned Chen, charging him with trumpedup charges to silence his criticism of the Chinese government.98
The fact that the Chinese officials originally jailed Chen as a
response to his legal activism shows a clear intent to punish Chen for
opposing Chinese policy.99 Furthermore, that Chen was held under
house arrest and repeatedly beaten, shows an organized effort to
maintain his punishment.100 Chen had done nothing new to warrant
punishment, evidenced by China’s failure to file new charges against
Chen, which further demonstrates that Chinese officials sought to
continue constraining Chen’s speech and activity.101
The final requirement for these acts to be considered torture is that
they must be committed by someone in an official capacity.102 In
addition to satisfying the previous elements under the Convention
Against Torture, Chen’s treatment constitutes torture because local
officials conducted the abuse. Chen was held under house arrest and
beaten by plain-clothed guards hired by local government officials.103
Reports indicate that high-level Chinese government officials did not
directly participate, and instead local security guards instigated and
acquiesced to the torture;104 this, however, does not preclude a claim
97. See Eckholm, supra note 18 (describing widespread acceptance that
charges were filed against Chen in 2006 simply because he brought class-action
lawsuits against forced abortion policies).
98. See Richburg & Mufson, supra note 19 (describing Chen’s trial on
obstructing traffic charges as a sham that has been largely discredited).
99. See China’s Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng, supra note 12 (affirming that
many believe the Chinese government brought charges against Chen simply to
silence him).
100. See Lynch, supra note 14 (quoting Professor Jerome A. Cohen, a Chinese
legal scholar, as saying “[t]his cruel, slow killing seems to be the only way the
Party can think of to rid itself of a courageous critic without having him appear to
die in its custody”).
101. See id. (“Lacking any legal basis under Chinese law and in contravention to
multiple international treaties, since his ‘release,’ Chen and his wife have not been
able to leave their home.”).
102. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1(1); see also Bromfield v.
Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that those in an official
capacity need only be willfully blind to the torture).
103. Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6.
104. See China’s Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng, supra note 12 (stating
analysts believe that local security was “apparently acting outside the law but with
the authorities’ approval”).
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of torture.105
Even if Chinese government officials did not direct the local
officials to torture Chen, his harsh treatment was well documented
by human rights organizations and media throughout the world,
making it difficult to believe that high-level officials were unaware
of the abuse.106 In addition, the international community condemned
China’s treatment of Chen in Shandong province, with prominent
international figures calling for investigation into the matter.107 The
massive coverage of Chen’s circumstances was enough to put China
on notice that local officials were conducting torture, yet still China
did nothing to remedy the situation or even inquire into the
allegations.108 The Chinese government was at least willfully blind to
the torture of Chen by local officials, even though they did not carry
out the torture themselves.109 Moreover, Chinese officials have not
objected to claims that local officials tortured Chen nor have they
condemned such actions, suggesting tacit approval of the local

105. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1 (articulating that
torture can be found where there is “acquiescence of a public official”).
106. See Richburg & Mufson, supra note 19 (referencing several groups
monitoring Chen’s detention, including the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the
Asia Society, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Chinese
community website Boxun.com); China’s Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng, supra
note 12 (reporting on politicians who voiced concern for Chen, such as Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton).
107. See Clinton Presses China on Human Rights Before Hu’s Visit, CHANNEL
NEWS ASIA (Jan. 15, 2011), www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/
view/1104813/1/.html (detailing how Secretary of State Clinton urged China to
release numerous dissidents, including Chen, before a State visit by Hu Jintao).
108. See Chen, supra note 16 (recounting how Chen asked the Chinese
government to investigate the abuse, though Chinese officials have done nothing);
see also Political Prisoners in China: Trends and Implications for U.S. Policy
Before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 112th Cong. (2010)
(statement of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law & Co-Director, US-Asia Law
Institute New York University), available at www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/
2010/20100803/statement2.php (testifying that political dissidents are often
harassed by police and detained after serving their sentences, suggesting that
Chinese officials have knowledge of these practices).
109. See ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, Impact of Human Rights on State
Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BEYOND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON
SOVEREIGNTY, NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 367, 371–72 (2011)
(stating that the International Law Commission considers acts committed by any
division or agency of the State to be conduct attributable to that State, especially in
cases of human rights violations such as torture).
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officials’ conduct.110
The local officials’ maltreatment of Chen is in line with the
systematic handling of legal activists in China, further supporting the
claim that the Chinese government either knew about or implicitly
endorsed the use of torture.111 Lawyers in China are often subjected
to violence, including the physical assault of lawyers attempting to
conduct court business.112 Such actions, like in Chen’s case, amount
to torture as government officials inflict this physical pain on
lawyers113 to intimidate them to behave in a certain way.114 This
evidence shows a generalized tendency of China to violate
prohibitions against torture.115 Therefore, because local Chinese
officials caused Chen to physically suffer through beatings intended
to punish Chen for his past actions and to intimidate him into ceasing
his activism in the future,116 the Chinese government’s conduct
toward Chen amounts to torture.117 Torture is a human rights
violation118 and, consequently, a violation of international law.
110. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5 (failing to object to the
claim that Chinese officials beat Chen while he was under house arrest).
111. E.g., Thomas Lum & Hannah Fischer, Human Rights in China: Trends and
Policy Implications, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA 21 (Lee R. Massingdale ed.,
2009) (“Many human rights and defense lawyers have been harassed by officials or
beaten by plain-clothes agents of local State agencies or economic interests.”).
112. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WALKING ON THIN ICE: CONTROL, INTIMIDATION
AND HARASSMENT OF LAWYERS IN CHINA 41 (2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0408_1.pdf.
113. See id. at 44 (detailing how court officials physically assaulted a lawyer
who attempted to file a complaint with the court).
114. See Lum & Fischer, supra note 111, at 22 (“Lawyers who had publicly
offered to defend Tibetan protesters in 2008 were warned not to get involved or
they would face disciplinary action.”).
115. See id. at 20 (“The [S]tate [of China] still wields disproportionate power
against citizens and legal activists and continues to interpret the law arbitrarily in
many cases.”).
116. See MCCORQUODALE, supra note 109, at 371–72 (supporting that acts
committed by local government officials are still attributable to the State in torture
cases).
117. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing
an analytical framework that demonstrates it is sufficient that there was
acquiescence on the part of the Chinese government to the treatment of Chen to
constitute torture).
118. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 80–81, 116 (Dec. 19) (ruling by a vote of sixteen to one
that torture and other abuses conducted by the Republic of Uganda constituted a
violation of “its obligation under international human rights law and international
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Therefore, China’s torture of Chen is both a human rights violation
and a violation of international law.

B. THE UNITED STATES IS PROHIBITED FROM FORCIBLY
RETURNING CHEN TO CHINA BECAUSE THERE IS SUFFICIENT
REASON TO BELIEVE CHEN WILL BE SUBJECT TO TORTURE ON HIS
RELEASE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIJING
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture forbids the United
States, under the doctrine of nonrefoulement, from returning Chen to
China.119 Nonrefoulement prohibits a State from returning an
individual to another State where that person is at risk to be
tortured.120 To determine whether a person is at substantial risk of
torture, the sending State must consider both specific and generalized
tendencies of the receiving State to use torture.121 Chen’s case
satisfies both of these conditions.
China’s practices concerning prisoners and detainees demonstrate
a significant risk of torture for legal activists like Chen in China.
China has a lengthy record of torturing activists like Chen, showing a
generalized tendency to engage in torture.122 According to the U.S.
State Department, China often utilizes “extralegal measures” to
intimidate and coerce public interest lawyers and political activists.123
humanitarian law”).
119. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Bachan Singh Sogi v. Can.,
Communication No. 297/2006, U.N. Doc. A/63/44, at 224 (Nov. 16, 2007) (noting
that, if a complainant establishes a substantial risk of torture in his country of
origin, the complainant cannot be returned there); see also Bromfield, 543 F.3d at
1079 (supporting that courts and tribunals often rely on country reports to establish
evidence of an individual’s risk of torture or persecution in his or her home State).
120. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 3.
121. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil
Agiza v. Swed., Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 227 (May
20, 2005) (explaining both particularized and generalized tendencies are required
because the existence of one does not necessitate the existence of the other).
122. See LI, supra note 30, at 120–22 (highlighting how, although physical
abuse of prisoners and detainees is prohibited, torture regularly occurs in China).
123. See, e.g., STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT, supra note 30, at 4
(documenting how Jiang Tianyoung, a lawyer in China, was beaten for two nights
although he was ultimately never charged with anything); see also LI, supra note
30, at 121–22 (detailing how security guards beat a recent college graduate for
failing to carry the proper identification card). But see China Hits Back on U.S.
Human Rights, CNN (May 25, 2012), articles.cnn.com/2012-05-25/asia_china-ushuman-rights_1_human-rights-china-hits-annual-report?_s=PM:ASIA (reporting
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Additionally, the risk of torture in China of activists and dissidents is
well-documented in asylum cases and claims for other relief brought
in American courts under the Convention Against Torture.124
Therefore, China’s generalized tendencies and practices show that
Chen, as a lawyer and activist, faces a substantial risk that he will be
tortured on his return.125
Similarly, the particularized actions of local officials toward Chen
establish that, once he was returned to China from the U.S. Embassy,
he faced an exceptional risk of torture. Specifically, Chen and his
family were subjected to torture through beatings and arbitrary house
arrest.126 These instances occurred just days and weeks before he
sought protection from the American Embassy.127 Furthermore, these
actions of abuse against Chen were not part of his previous sentence,
which was already completed when he was put under house arrest.128
Thus, there is substantial risk that Chen’s torture will continue on his
return to China as it occurred repeatedly until he sought refuge in the
U.S. Embassy.
Historically, nonrefoulement under the Convention Against
Torture is applied in cases where the individual is within the territory

Chinese criticism of the State Department’s report and claim that “[t]he United
States’ tarnished human rights record has left it in no state to act as the world’s
‘human rights justice’”).
124. See, e.g., Cao v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 407 F.3d 146, 156, 161
(3d Cir. 2005) (finding a severe enough risk of torture to prevent repatriation).
125. See STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT, supra note 30, at 3–4 (noting that
although rules of evidence ban the use of information gathered through torture,
there are many reports of former prisoners and detainees, especially political and
religious dissidents, being tortured).
126. Cf. Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Bachan Singh Sogi v. Can.,
Communication No. 297/2006, U.N. Doc. A/63/44, at 235 (Nov. 16, 2007)
(finding removal of an Indian national from Canada violated the Convention
Against Torture because there was sufficient specific evidence that the national
would be tortured upon return to India for his alleged participation in a terrorist
organization).
127. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, A.R. v. Neth., Communication No.
203/2002, U.N. Doc. A/59/44, at 247–53 (Nov. 14, 2003) (articulating the
requirement that acts showing specific tendencies must not have occurred too long
before seeking refuge).
128. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1 (establishing that the
Convention does not apply to “pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions”).
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of the State where they are seeking shelter.129 The fact that Chen was
not actually within the borders of the United States, but in an
American Embassy in his home State, does not undermine the United
States’ duty to him because nonrefoulement has no geographic
limitation.130 Although no cases have addressed nonrefoulement
under the Convention Against Torture, its language is sufficiently
similar to nonrefoulement under the Refugee Convention131 that the
ruling in Haitian Interdiction is arguably applicable.132
Under the Haitian Interdiction holding, nonrefoulement applies
regardless of the protected individual’s geographic location. Indeed,
Article 5 of the Convention Against Torture suggests that universal
jurisdiction applies in torture cases, consistent with the holding in
the Haitian Interdiction case.133 Additionally, given the intent of the
Convention Against Torture is to prevent inhumane and degrading
treatment,134 returning an individual to a risk of torture just because
129. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil
Agiza v. Swed., Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 227 (May
20, 2005) (regarding a complainant who was returned to Egypt by Sweden after
seeking asylum in Stockholm).
130. See Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 71, 157 (1997)
(discussing the extension of the nonrefoulement duty under the Refugee
Convention regardless of geographic location).
131. Compare Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 3(1) (stating
that “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be
in danger of being subjected to torture”), with Refugee Convention, supra note
53, art. 33 (declaring that “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion”).
132. See Haitian Interdiction, Case 10.675, ¶¶ 71, 88 (indicating that a State
breaches its duty under customary international law and Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention when it returns a person to a place where he or she faces
persecution).
133. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 5(2) (“Each State party
shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over such offences [of torture] in cases where the alleged offender is present in any
territory under its jurisdiction . . . .”).
134. See DANELIUS, supra note 41, at 1–2 (recounting that the “General
Assembly specifically requested the Commission on Human Rights to draw up a
draft convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, in the light of the principles embodied in the Torture
Declaration”).
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he or she was apprehended outside the territorial borders of a nation
would defeat the purpose of the Convention.135 Thus, being under
the authority of a State imposes obligations on the State not to
frustrate the purpose of a treaty on a technicality.136 In addition, it
does not matter that Chen did not seek asylum or refugee status
when he reached the American embassy, because nonrefoulement,
as imposed under the Convention Against Torture, does not require
that the individual be a refugee or asylum-seeker.137
Instead of forbidding the United States from taking action,
international law actually imposes a duty on the United States to
take measures to shelter Chen.138 The basic tenets of
nonrefoulement prohibit the return of an individual to a State where
he or she is at risk of torture, and because Chen is at substantial risk
of torture in China, the United States cannot return him there. The
Chinese government has shown both generalized and specific
tendencies that make it likely that Chen will be tortured on his
return to China.139 It does not matter that Chen entered American
protection outside of U.S. territory because nonrefoulement has no
territorial limitations.140 Since both Article 5 of the Convention
135. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 62, art. 18,
(declaring that “[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty”); see also Brief of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1, 11 (11th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-6060),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,UNHCR,AMICUS,HTI,
4b03cd4c2,0.html1992) (arguing that denying individuals seized outside U.S.
territory nonrefoulement protection defeats the purpose of the Refugee
Convention).
136. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 62, art. 18
(emphasizing that a State that has expressed its consent to be bound by a treaty is
obligated to refrain from acts that would defeat the object of the treaty).
137. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding a
claimant may obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture in American law
even if the claimant cannot assert an asylum claim).
138. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 5 (extending universal
jurisdiction to torture cases regardless of territory or nationality).
139. See, e.g., Cao v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 407 F.3d 146, 149–59
(3d Cir. 2005) (finding that specific evidence of persecution of a doctor who
spoke out about infanticide and evidence of general tendencies of the Chinese
government merited protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against
Torture).
140. See discussion supra Part II(C) (detailing the justifications for broadening
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture beyond geographical limitations to
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Against Torture and the Haitian Interdiction case impose
nonrefoulement duties on State Parties, the United States is bound
by these obligations.141
If international law imposes an obligation on a State, that State
cannot violate international law while simultaneously fulfilling that
duty. Because the United States has a duty not to return Chen to
China imposed by Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture,142
the United States did not illegally infringe on China’s internal
affairs by protecting Chen at the American Embassy.143
By protecting Chen and refusing to return him to China, the
United States has complied with its duties under international
law.144 Furthermore, the United States did not interfere any more
than was absolutely necessary to meet its obligations under the
Convention Against Torture.145 This shows that the American
Embassy intended to stay out of China’s internal affairs when
possible.146 Indeed, the United States did not seek out Chen in
China, but rather the United States simply protected Chen once he
arrived at the American Embassy.147 Any alleged interference did
not occur until after Chen arrived at the Embassy, meaning that the
United States could not have meddled in China’s internal affairs
before the obligation to protect Chen arose.
apply universally).
141. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 170 (mentioning that obligations are only
imposed if a State has signed onto or agrees to be bound by a treaty).
142. See, e.g., Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997)
(explaining that nonrefoulement protection was extended over Haitian refugees or
boat people even though they were not physically on American soil).
143. See discussion infra Part III(C) (analyzing the dominance of jus cogens
norms, particularly torture, over all other treaties).
144. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, arts. 1–5 (detailing the
duty to define torture, to ensure it is criminalized, to assert jurisdiction over torture
cases, and to not return a person to a country where they are in danger of being
subjected to torture).
145. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (describing the manner in which Chen
came under United States protection, with contact initiated by Chen’s supporters,
not the United States).
146. See Ku, supra note 27 (describing that the United States bargained with
Chinese officials for assurances of Chen’s safety).
147. See Chen, supra note 16 (recounting, in an article written by Chen himself,
that he sought refuge in the American Embassy in Beijing after his escape from
house arrest).
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C. SOME HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, SUCH AS ENGAGING IN
TORTURE, ARE ALSO VIOLATIONS OF JUS COGENS NORMS,
JUSTIFYING INTERFERENCE BY THE UNITED STATES IN CHINA’S
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
When a conflict between jus cogens norms and treaty obligations
exists, jus cogens norms supersede the treaty obligations.148 The
prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm from which China cannot
derogate.149
Even if China permits such treatment under its domestic laws,
these national or local laws do not supersede duties imposed under
international human rights law.150 However, Chinese domestic law
actually prohibits torture of prisoners and detainees.151 This alone,
however, does not inhibit China from violating international human
rights law.152 Laws that make torture illegal are not enough to comply
with jus cogens norms, especially when torture regularly occurs
regardless of domestic law. The Chinese government was willfully
blind to the torture perpetrated against Chen and his family by local
officials, which is sufficient to constitute an act of torture.153 China’s
acquiescence to the local officials’ torture amounts to a human rights
violation.154
By permitting torture against Chen, the Chinese government not

148. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 177 (explaining that when a treaty conflicts
with jus cogens norms, the treaty should be construed in a manner that is consistent
with the jus cogens norm); see also ROTH, supra note 65, at 264 (noting that jus
cogens restricts the substance of treaties by imposing duties that States must follow
and must be incorporated in the treaties).
149. See discussion supra Part II(D) (establishing the obligations imposed by jus
cogens norms on the international community).
150. See generally Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 62/02, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶¶ 84–87
(2002) (supporting, through precedent, the predominance of human rights law over
domestic law).
151. STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.
152. See Omelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that an inference of torture is sufficient to find government acquiescence).
153. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2008)
(endorsing the concept that willful blindness is sufficient to constitute an official
act of torture).
154. See Omelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1060 (“It is enough that public officials
could have inferred the alleged torture was taking place, remained willfully blind
to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it.”).
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only violated the Convention Against Torture, but also violated jus
cogens norms, which prohibit a nation’s officials from engaging in or
willfully permitting torture.155 The argument that China violated jus
cogens is relatively simple: the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens
norm,156 China tortured Chen,157 and therefore China violated jus
cogens norm prohibiting torture. More complex is the question of
what consequences will or should result from this violation.158
The Chinese government argues that Article 41 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations supersedes the ability of the
United States to respond to allegations of torture.159 However, when a
treaty conflicts with a jus cogens norm, the inconsistent provision
should be interpreted, if possible, to comply with the jus cogens
norm.160 The conflict between Article 41 and the jus cogens
prohibition of torture is that Article 41 seemingly prevents a State
from abiding by its obligations in situations where an individual
seeks shelter from another State’s jus cogens violations. Thus, China
argues, Article 41 must be construed as inapplicable to situations
where an embassy assists a foreign national suffering from severe
human rights abuses under the host State.161
Furthermore, because all States have a responsibility to prevent
human rights abuses, the United States should take action to do so if
possible.162 States are required to take every measure possible to
prevent human rights abuses from occurring within their

155. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 202–03 (declaring that the breach of
protection of fundamental interests, which includes the prohibition of torture, is a
violation of recognized jus cogens norms).
156. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note
64, § 102 cmt. k (arguing that the rule against torture is part of international law
and that jus cogens permits no derogation of it).
157. See discussion supra Part III(B).
158. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 206–08 (enumerating the legal effects of jus
cogens norms on international law, including the following: invalidation of a treaty
provision, interpretation of a treaty provision to conform with jus cogens norms,
and granting universal criminal jurisdiction over the transgressors).
159. See Nong, supra note 25; Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5.
160. CASSESE, supra note 66, at 206.
161. See ROTH, supra note 65, at 264–65 (noting the importance of jus cogens in
the normative hierarchy structure).
162. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, arts. 2, 5 (mandating that
each State Party take action to prevent torture from occurring within its territory
and to establish jurisdiction over cases of torture).
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jurisdiction.163 Chen sought out American jurisdiction by fleeing to
the American Embassy.164 Although an embassy is not the territory
of the sending State, once a person is granted refuge in an embassy
that person is under the sending State’s control even though the
person is not within the State’s physical territory by virtue of the
inviolability of the diplomatic mission.165 Once Chen sought
protection from the American Embassy, the United States had an
obligation to protect him from torture and human rights abuses.166
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention prevents interference with the
internal affairs of a State, whereas human rights principles are an
area of international law; therefore, human rights issues cannot
constitute internal affairs.167 As such, the responsibility to prevent
human rights abuses, which runs to all States, cannot logically
amount to an impermissible interference in a State’s internal
affairs.168 Otherwise, violators could never be punished or held
accountable for crimes that are committed within their own State,
because those matters could simply be categorized as wholly
internal.169

163. See Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 174 (July 29, 1988) (elucidating that protecting individuals
from violations is the ultimate goal of human rights law).
164. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (inferring that Chen, with the help of his
supporters, subjected himself to American jurisdiction when he fled to the
American Embassy and obtained temporary protection from the abuses of the
Chinese government).
165. RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, § 466,
cmt. b; see also Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 274–75 (Nov. 20,
1950) (holding that a grant of asylum removes the individual from the host State’s
jurisdiction even though the individual may still be within the host State’s
territory).
166. See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, §
466, cmt. b (Reporter’s note 3) (adding that the United States typically only grants
such protection in exceptional cases to political refugees who are in immediate
danger).
167. See Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 41 (preventing interference
with internal affairs (emphasis added)).
168. CASSESE, supra note 66, at 394; see also Dominquez v. United States, Case
12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 62/02, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.117, doc. 1
rev. 1 (2002) (declaring that human rights law supersedes domestic law).
169. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 398 (remarking that institutional
enforcement mechanisms such as the United Nations “have not yielded
conspicuous results”).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Chen’s case presents an opportunity for the international
community to enhance protection for victims of torture and human
rights abuses. To avoid future diplomatic conflicts in cases where a
national of a host State seeks protection from a foreign State’s
embassy170 it is necessary to clarify the law regarding the obligations
of States in such circumstances.171

A. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CLARIFY ITS POLICY REGARDING
ARTICLE 41 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RIGHTS
WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL SEEKS PROTECTION WITHIN AN EMBASSY
Article 41’s language concerning what actions amount to
interference in internal affairs is ambiguous, prompting
disagreements over its interpretation. One pivotal issue in Chen’s
case revolves around what actions constitute interference in the
internal affairs of a State.172 The problem is that international law
does not define or even provide guidance on what actions constitute
interference in internal affairs of a host State.173 If this ambiguity
were explicitly clarified, then all States would have a consistent
understanding of their duties.174
170. E.g., Flintoff, supra note 3 (referring to Fang Lizhi who experienced abuse
similar to that inflicted on Chen).
171. See DENZA, supra note 1, at 465 (“Most conduct which on the part of a
diplomatic agent lays him open to the charge of interference in the internal affairs
of the receiving State will at least in democratic societies be permissible under
local law and quite proper in the case of a citizen of the receiving State.”).
172. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5 (“China demands the
US to apologize for that, carry out a thorough investigation into the incident, deal
with those responsible, and promise not to let similar incidents happen again.”).
See also Nong, supra note 25 (denouncing the United State’s actions as
interference in internal affairs by hindering the economic development of China);
US Must Insist on Chen Guangcheng’s Safety, AMNESTY INT’L (May 2,
2012), www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/us-must-insist-on-chen-guangchengs-safety (arguing the United States, and other governments, have an obligation to
protect Chen and other Chinese citizens from human rights abuses).
173. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 2, at 76 (citing Memorandum of Reply
Concerning the Bill for the Approval of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, 1984 NYIL 308) (stating there are no international guidelines regarding
Article 41 and “it should be pointed out that there are any number of ways in
which a person could set about interfering in internal affairs”).
174. See Milhaupt, supra note 39, at 847 (asserting that under some
interpretations anything negatively affecting or even implicating the host State
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The most comprehensive way to clarify Article 41 would be to
amend the convention directly. Although it would be impracticable
to designate every possible action as either interference or
noninterference, it would be possible to prevent interference in
internal affairs by providing guidance on what exactly this means.175
For example, an amendment could specify that interference in
internal affairs would not be found where the alleged interfering
State is acting under a jus cogens or treaty obligation. This would
have the added benefit of designating levels of authority, indicating
to States which sources of international law supersede others. Thus,
in future similar incidents, there would be some kind of precedent
revealing what authority binds a State.
Alternatively, it would be helpful to change Article 41(1) to read
that there is a “duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State
through personal activities or comments.” This new construction of
Article 41 would make it clear that the rule does not apply to
measures taken by an embassy pursuant to its duties under
international law simply because they incidentally touch on domestic
issues.176 Amending Article 41 in this way would clarify its
ambiguous language, leading to a more consistent understanding of
this section.

B. THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE SHOULD INCLUDE A
PROVISION CLEARLY STATING THAT ARTICLE 3 APPLIES
REGARDLESS OF GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
Another way to clarify States’ responsibilities is to unquestionably
extend universal jurisdiction to the doctrine of nonrefoulement.
Nonrefoulement provides strong protections to individuals who face
persecution in their home countries.177 Although Article 5 imposes
could be considered interference in internal affairs).
175. See DENZA, supra note 1, at 464 (explaining that the rule in Article 41(1)
was intended to concern the personal comments or activities conducted by a
diplomat in a host State and not to acts carried out on directive from the sending
State).
176. See Milhaupt, supra note 39, at 847 (examining several alternatives,
including, but not limited to, expanding the list of consular functions specified
within the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
177. See generally Shafer, supra note 50, § 2 (exploring the enactment of
Convention Against Torture provisions within the United States and American
courts’ interpretation of the Convention).
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universal jurisdiction regarding instances of torture, the Convention
Against Torture does not explicitly state that nonrefoulement applies
regardless of geographic limitations.178
Case law under the Convention Against Torture does not impose
geographical limitations on the application of Article 3.179 However,
nonrefoulement as defined in the Refugee Convention has been held
to apply without any geographical constraints.180 The Convention
Against Torture should therefore incorporate a provision that
encompasses the holding of the Haitian Interdiction case.
Specifically, to clarify state obligations, such a provision should state
that the principle of nonrefoulement applies no matter where an
individual comes under the receiving State’s protection.181 This
clarification would create a uniform nonrefoulement policy.
Modifying the Convention Against Torture, however, is not the
only way to ensure the Convention applies regardless of geographic
limitations. Instead of an addition to Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture, the United States could also amend the enabling
statute that codifies the Convention Against Torture.182 The United
178. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 5(2) (stating that
“[e]ach State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant
to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article”).
179. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Bachan Singh Sogi v. Can.,
Communication No. 297/2006, U.N. Doc. A/63/44, at 224–35 (Nov. 16, 2007)
(focusing mostly on the different factors that the court considered when
determining whether a man faced a risk of torture if returned to India); Rep. of the
Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Swed.,
Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 197 (May 20, 2005) (failing
to mention the applicability of nonrefoulement when an individual is brought
under protection outside of a State’s physical territory); Rep. of the Comm.
Against Torture, A.R. v. Neth., Communication No. 203/2002, U.N. Doc. A/59/44,
at 247, 252 (Nov. 14, 2003) (recording only factors relevant to determining
whether there is a risk of torture).
180. Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 171 (1997) (finding that
nonrefoulement applies to Haitian refugees intercepted on the high seas by the U.S.
Coast Guard despite not being on American soil).
181. See Political Prisoners in China, supra note 108 (describing the glacial
pace of discussions between the United States and China on human rights issues
and encouraging increased dialogue between the two nations).
182. See 60 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) (referring only to the removal of
individuals from the United States and not to any geographic element necessary for
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States often clarifies treaty obligations through domestic law.183
Although domestic laws do not necessarily create international
legal obligations, in this case it could help demonstrate a state
practice of applying nonrefoulement regardless of geographic
location. In accordance with Congress’ own commitment to Article
3,184 it should apply Article 3 privileges regardless of where an alien
enters American protection. This would strengthen the enforceability
of the Convention Against Torture in the United States in accordance
with international law. Whether it is appended to the Convention
Against Torture or to the United States’ enabling statute, the new
language should state that Article 3 of the Convention Against
Torture applies without any geographical limitations.185

V. CONCLUSION
By protecting Chen at the American Embassy in Beijing, the
United States did not violate international law, contrary to the
Chinese government’s claims.186 The United States cannot legally
return Chen to China because there is sufficient reason to believe that
he will be tortured on his return.187 Because Article 3 of the
Convention Against torture imposes a duty on the United States not
to return Chen,188 the American Embassy did not illegally infringe on
protection).
183. Id.; see also Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001)
(maintaining that an individual may seek relief under the Convention regardless of
an asylum claim).
184. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) (confirming that Congress intended to uphold Article 3 and
that future obligations must be consistent with treaty obligations).
185. See Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 157 (1997) (“The
Commission shares the view advanced by the United Nations Commissioner for
Refugees in its Amicus Curiae brief in its arguments before the Supreme Court,
that Article 33 [establishing nonrefoulement in the Refugee Convention] had no
geographical limitations.”).
186. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5 (describing the Chinese
government’s dissatisfaction with the U.S. Embassy’s actions); Nong, supra note
25 (same).
187. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 3 (stating that the
doctrine of nonrefoulement applies when there are substantial grounds to believe
that he or she would be subject to torture in his or her home country).
188. See Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997) (applying this
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China’s internal affairs by protecting Chen. Furthermore, China’s
treatment of Chen amounts to torture,189 which is a violation of the
jus cogens norm prohibiting torture.190 Because no derogation from
jus cogens norms is permitted, China’s violations justify limited
encroachment by the United States.191

obligation even to individuals brought under protection outside the territory of the
United States).
189. C.f. Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008)
(evaluating the case of a gay man who faced torture in Jamaica).
190. See Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 62/02, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶¶ 84–87 (2002) (indicating
that practices that the global community considers to be inconsistent with
prevailing standards of decency violate jus cogens norms).
191. See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, § 703
(declaring that a State “may pursue international remedies against any other state
for a violation of the customary international law of human rights”).

